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Abstract: Our paper offers evidence that the print media can affect stock prices by 
covering public information. After price-to-book value figures of Italian listed shares 
were first published on the major national financial newspaper, the prices of value 
stocks did, on average, show a positive reaction. The price reaction was limited to 
small caps stocks and disappeared within three weeks. Over the period of analysis, 
we could not find any abnormal behaviour of the returns of small and value stocks 
on other European markets. These findings support the view that newspapers play 
a role in disseminating information to small investors and grabbing their attention, 
even if news are continuously realeased by faster and more sophisticated media.
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1. Introduction and main findings
Financial markets feed on information. Investors set the intrinsic value (also known as the fair value) 
of financial assets, and consequently decide whether to buy or sell, on the basis of their expectations 
on issuers’ business fundamentals and on the macroeconomic context. Expectations depend on the 
quality and quantity of information available and on the investors’ ability to process it correctly. The 
role played by information is so important that one of the criteria for evaluating the efficiency of fi-
nancial markets is based on how it is reflected in market prices, as expressed in Fama’s well-known 
definitions of efficiency (Fama, 1970).
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Relevant information for investors consists of fresh news not yet reflected in securities prices. 
Since this kind of information can have important effects on prices, its release is usually referred to 
as an ‘event’. According to the market efficiency theory, only fresh news affect prices; however, the 
financial literature has documented many anomalies in this respect.
Huberman and Regev (2001) provide a macroscopic example that the press is able to influence 
prices even by publishing contents that can be considered as ‘non-events’, because they do not add 
to or improve on currently available information. The authors note that in response to the publica-
tion in the New York Times of Sunday, 3 May 1998, of an article about the potential development of 
a new cancer drug, there was a significant, permanent growth in the stock price of the company 
concerned and, to a lesser extent, of the whole biotechnology sector, even though the news was far 
from fresh. Indeed, it had already been published several months earlier by the scientific journal 
Nature, taken up on the very same day by the popular press (Newsdays and the New York Times it-
self) and by some television programmes (CNN’s MoneyLine and CNBC’s Street Signs). Back then the 
stock price of the involved company rose strongly, but the variation was much lower than the surge 
generated by the 3 May article: +28.4% compared to +330%. The May article contained basically the 
same information as the former, but was given greater emphasis with regard to the spin, which was 
much more optimistic, and appeared as front-page news while the previous did not. Huberman and 
Regev’s focus is on the efficiency of financial markets, and appear to interpret this story as showing 
that, by changing the emphasis, the press can trigger price reactions even by publishing news that 
are, strictly speaking, not such.
Also on the subject of non-events, Ho and Michaely (1988) claim that journalists’ negative com-
ments on a specific stock, which the authors assess as the mere reworking of public information, 
cause a significant price reduction from the day before to the day after the publication; also, price 
falls are particularly large for small companies.
Adding emphasis or controlling the degree of importance given to a specific news item is also 
viewed as critical by Dyck and Zingales (2003), who see this as the defining characteristic of the pa-
per media. The authors analyse how the stock market reacts to the publication of earning announce-
ments, conditioning on whether GAAP or pro-forma figures are stated first in newspaper articles. The 
degree of influence is found to be stronger when investors have few sources of information beyond 
the paper media (approximated by the number of financial analysts monitoring a specific company) 
and when the newspaper’s reputation is good. These findings suggest that investors do consider the 
information conveyed by newspapers even if it has already been published or is available from other 
channels, and this can affect stock prices. According to the authors there may be various reasons for 
this: (a) even in the Internet age, sourcing information is expensive and the paper media broaden 
the audience of informed investors, (b) newspapers enjoy greater credibility than the web and (c) 
they convey shared knowledge, since each reader acquires not only information but also the aware-
ness that it has been provided to a large number of other people. A further interesting finding by 
Dyck and Zingales is that the spin given to news by the press follows the lead of the sources; in other 
words, the press releases of listed companies are probably reported with positive spin to win favour 
with the issuers and thus obtain first-hand information more easily from it in the future.1
Outside the world of print newspaper, Engelberg, Sasseville, and Williams (2012) and Shabani 
(2012) document market reactions to TV broadcast stale information. Tetlock (2011) finds a market 
reactions to stories published on the DJ newswires with the release of information that is stale to 
some degree. All these papers uncover return reversals and that retail investors trade more aggres-
sively than professional investors on second-hand news.
The aim of our paper was to provide evidence that the press may temporarily influence prices of 
small stocks by publishing news already of public domain even without adding emphasis to it or 
exercising any selective coverage. Since in Italy, retail investors play a key role in the trading of small 
stocks and newspapers are still their main means of acquiring information, simply publishing 
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second-hand raw facts may have an impact on the market. However, a non-event of this type tends 
to trigger only a delayed price reaction, because its initial attention-grabbing potential is low.
The discounting of emphasis and spin factors differentiates this work from those of Ho and 
Michaely (1988), Huberman and Regev (2001), and Dyck and Zingales (2003), making it unique, to 
the best of our knowledge, in the literature on the relationship between the media and asset pricing.2 
Actually, Gilbert, Kogan, Lochstoer, and Ozyildirim (2012) identify a general market reaction to the 
release of a stale summary statistics (the Conference Board US Leading Economic Index®—LEI), but 
their stale news is a macroeconomic information released on a predetermined schedule while our 
stale statistics (the PBV ratio) relates to individual stocks and its first time publication was 
unexpected.
Our study focuses on the Italian Stock Exchange, the European stock market with the lowest inci-
dence of foreign demand and the highest incidence of individual investors in the ownership struc-
ture of the listed companies (Coraggio & Franzosi, 2008; Federation of European Securities Exchanges 
[FESE], 2007). More specifically, Coraggio & Franzosi (2008) show that, in Italy, the ratio of shares 
directly owned by households to the one indirectly owned (though mutual funds, pension funds and 
insurance companies) is equal to 4.7% and this ratio is higher than the one in other financially de-
veloped countries. Indirect channels of shareholding are preferred by the UK, Dutch and Danish 
households for which direct/indirect ratio falls below 1. In these countries, equity is held primarily 
through pension funds and insurance companies due to the expansion reached by institutional in-
vestors among households. Moreover, Coraggio and Franzosi (2008) show that institutional investors 
such as mutual funds, in Italy, exhibit the lowest percentage of assets invested in equity (20.6%). An 
opposition situation occurs in UK where mutual funds are characterized by a high propensity to eq-
uity (74%).
The opportunity that makes our analyses possible is that, on 1 March 2002, the most widely read 
Italian financial newspaper, Il Sole 24 Ore, started publishing the PBV ratio of all the stocks listed on 
the Borsa Italiana MTA (‘Mercato Telematico Azionario’, the main Italian electronic stock exchange) 
alongside the price-earnings, price-to-cash flow and dividend yield multiples it had already been 
printing for several years.3 The multiples represent relative prices, which may make it easier to com-
pare stocks, especially within the same economic sector. By looking at the multiples, for example, 
the reader can distinguish between ‘value’ and ‘growth’ stocks, and thus draw up investment strate-
gies focusing on one category rather than the other.4 Some people consider that multiples are also 
helpful for stock picking, i.e. for identifying mispriced stocks5.
Since it is reasonable to assume that, thanks to the work of financial analysts and financial data 
providers, at least part of the market (securities brokers, professional and institutional investors) is 
already familiar with the multiples, regardless of whether or not they are published in the newspa-
pers, it is fair to classify the publication of the PBV on Il Sole 24 Ore as a non-event and to expect not 
to observe any effect on stock prices after it.
However, our econometric analyses lead to reject this hypothesis. When we examine the returns 
on the two portfolios, each formed by 50 MTA stocks with, respectively, the highest and lowest PBV, 
some interesting evidence emerges. While during the weeks before 1 March 2002, both portfolios did 
not show any abnormal returns (ARs), from that day onwards the 50 low-PBV stocks gradually 
achieved a statistically significant extra performance, while the high-PBV portfolio did not show any 
anomalies.
The delayed and transitory price reaction of the low-PBV portfolio, which is mainly composed by 
small firms, along with the absence of negative reactions after the event in the high-PBV portfolio, 
consisting of firms whose average size is much larger, are precisely what should be observed if the 
most sophisticated investors were already aware of the information while retail investors were not. 
Indeed, low-PBV stocks are held mostly by individual investors, show high illiquidity and the lack of 
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analyst coverage (Phalippou, 2008); small and value stocks also have a disproportionately high retail 
trading intensity (Kumar & Lee, 2006).
2. Data and samples
In order to form the two portfolios of stocks with the highest and lowest PBV, we considered all com-
mon shares quoted on the MTA, the PBV ratio of which appeared for the first time in the Il Sole 24 Ore 
of Friday 1 March 2002, the day of the (non-) event. The 231 stocks that meet this criterion, out of a 
total of 237 listed common stocks, were arranged in decreasing order by PBV value. The top ranking 
50 stocks formed the high-PBV portfolio (‘Top50’) and the bottom 50 the low-PBV portfolio 
(‘Bottom50’); both portfolios are equally weighted (EW).6 To reduce the risk of abnormal perfor-
mance not related to the event, three stocks delisted within 12 months after the end of the event 
period (28 March 2002) were excluded. In order to keep the size of the two portfolios unchanged, the 
two stocks deleted from the Top50 (Italgas and Ferretti) were replaced by those immediately below 
in the PBV ranking (Banca Intermobiliare and RAS) and the only stock deleted from the Bottom50 
(Marangoni) was replaced by that immediately above (Caltagirone). Panels A and B of Table 1 con-
tain descriptive statistics of the two portfolios, computed for several multiples, market capitalization 
and trade size; the last two columns contain the t-test for the difference in the mean values and the 
z-score of Wilcoxon, Mann&Whitney for the differences between the medians.
There are significant differences between the Bottom50 and the Top50 not only with regard to the 
mean PBV level (0.68× compared to 4.50×) but also in two other multiples: a price-to-cash flow of 
6.52× compared to 17.31× and a dividend yield of 3.47% compared to 1.93%. There is also a differ-
ence in price-earnings, with a mean value of 30.2× compared to 59.47×. With regard to size, the 
mean capitalization of the low-PBV companies is 10 times lower than that of the high-PBV firms: 
€729 million compared to €8,215 million; the gap between the median capitalization values is even 
greater, €93 million vs. €1,447. The mean trade size is also lower for the low-PBV companies: €2,902 
compared to €10,867. These features point to the Bottom50 stocks belonging to companies that are 
mainly small- and micro-caps, which makes them potentially attractive for retail traders; also, the 
statistics on multiples other then PBV clearly show their ‘value’ nature.
Since the Top50 and the Bottom50 stocks differ strongly in terms of size, we formed two EW port-
folios, each matching their respective average market capitalization. These portfolios were used in 
the analyses to control for the possible interference of a size effect, which might induce the spurious 
detection of PBV-related anomalies if small-cap stocks outperformed the market during the sample 
period. The constituents of the control portfolios were selected from the 131 stocks with mid-range 
PBV by matching their individual market capitalizations as close as possible with the Top50 and 
Bottom 50 stocks on a pair-wise basis. Panel C and D of Table 1 contain descriptive statistics of the 
two control portfolios; the tests on the difference between the Top50 portfolio and its control (Panel 
C) and between the Bottom50 portfolio and its control (Panel D) are also displayed.
As the data reveal, there is not any statistical difference between the Top50 portfolio and its con-
trol in terms of mean capitalization, though the companies in the Top50 portfolio have a 70% higher 
average market value. The same holds with respect to the mean trade size. As expected, the 
Bottom50 control portfolio has a significantly higher PBV (1.41× compared to 0.68×) and the Top50 
control portfolio has a significantly lower PBV (1.50× compared to 4.50×) than their respective coun-
terparts. The control of the high-PBV portfolio do differ significantly in having greater price-earnings 
and price-to-cash flow, but a lower dividend yield, while the control of the low-PBV portfolio shows 
lower price-earnings and a price-to-cash flow whose statistical significance is limited to the 
z-score.
While the two control samples seem fit to control for a potentially confounding size effect, a simi-
lar issue arises because of the growth and value slant of the Top50 and of the Bottom50 portfolios. 
As their statistics reveal, control portfolios are not a viable solution to this problem, which we de-
cided to address in two ways: (a) looking at the ARs of small&value stocks in other European 
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countries around our event day; (b) using the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model as a ro-
bustness-check benchmark for computing ARs.
The daily returns from 5 February 2001 to 28 March 2002 were calculated for the Top50 and 
Bottom50 portfolios as well as for their controls. For each portfolio there is a total of 290 observa-
tions, 270 before the event date and 19 afterwards.7 The daily return of each portfolio was calcu-
lated as the simple mean of the daily returns of its component stocks based on prices corrected for 
stock offerings and splits. All stock data used for this paper were collected from Datastream.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of PBV portfolios and control samples
Notes: The Top50 (Bottom50) portfolio includes the first (last) fifty stocks by PBV ranking as of 2.28.2002. The Top50’s 
(Bottom50’s) control sample replicates the average market capitalization of the Top50 (Bottom50) portfolio. The 
stocks of the control sample are selected from the stocks with mid-range PBV on a pair-wise basis. Tests regarding the 
differences between means and between medians are in the last two columns: Top50 portfolio vs. Bottom50 portfolio 
in Panel A; Top50 portfolio vs. its control sample in Panel C; Bottom50 portfolio vs. its control sample in Panel D. Source: 
Il Sole 24 Ore of 1 March, 2002?. * and ^ denote the 1% and 5% significance levels, respectively. z-Score: Wilcoxon/
Mann–Whitney.
Mean Median Min Max St_dev Obs t-Test z-Score
Panel A: Top50 portfolio
Price-earnings 59.47 27.63 6.72 696.96 116.07 45 1.40 4.24*
Price-cash flow 17.31 12.40 6.17 67.91 12.80 42 4.89* 5.96*
Price-to-book value 4.50 3.70 2.36 13.56 2.48 50 10.85* 8.61*
Dividend yield (%) 1.93 1.54 0.13 6.71 1.45 38 −3.87* 3.84*
Market cap (mln€) 8,215 1,447 30 63,718 14,707 50 3.57* 5.84*
Trade size (€) 10,867 6,581 800 63,469 12,491 50 4.35* 5.54*
Panel B: Bottom50 portfolio
Price-earnings 30.20 13.72 0.96 387.24 67.82 34
Price-cash flow 6.52 4.86 0.87 35.68 6.26 40
Price-to-book value 0.68 0.71 0.21 0.89 0.16 50
Dividend yield (%) 3.47 3.09 1.03 8.90 1.85 33
Market cap (mln€) 729 93 9 11,999 1,975 50
Trade size (€) 2,902 1,471 308 14,467 3,408 50
Panel C: Top50 control sample
Price-earnings 18.25 15.25 1.41 69.87 12.78 44 2.37^ 4.57*
Price-cash flow 8.68 7.28 1.08 35.68 6.78 42 3.86* 5.18*
Price-to-book value 1.50 1.48 0.87 2.32 0.42 50 8.43* 8.61*
Dividend yield (%) 2.88 2.96 0.57 6.55 1.32 42 −3.05* 3.36*
Market cap (mln€) 4,835 1,404 30 41,025 9,080 50 1.38 0.60
Trade size (€) 7,557 5,210 167 28,429 6,588 50 1.66 1.04
Panel D: Bottom50 control sample
Price-earnings 23.81 17.99 5.49 133.86 21.23 43 0.53 2.06
Price-cash flow 8.72 7.26 2.58 38.02 6.80 44 −1.54 2.59
Price-to-book value 1.41 1.34 0.90 2.32 0.38 50 −12.37* 8.61
Dividend yield (%) 3.01 2.67 0.95 7.44 1.42 35 1.14 0.91
Market cap (mln€) 679 91 8 9,593 1,697 50 0.14 0.24
Trade size (€) 3,540 2,246 67 25,527 4,521 50 −0.80 1.38
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3. Research method
In order to ascertain whether the publication of PBVs produced any effects on stock prices, we have 
used the event study method in its traditional version and by regression analysis. The event period 
consists of the 20 trading days prior to the event date (the whole month of February 2002), the event 
date (1 March 2002) and the 19 trading days that follow the event date (2 to 28 March 2002).8 Under 
the null hypothesis that stock prices went unaffected, ARs on the event date and over the following 
trading month are expected to be not significantly different from zero.
With the traditional approach, ARs over the time window t ∈ [−20, +19] surrounding the event date 
t = 0 are defined as the simple difference of the daily returns on the given portfolio and its control 
sample:
 
As a robustness check we have also computed ARs against the EW index of all stocks traded on the 
Borsa Italiana MTA. The literature has empirically shown that the returns on value-weighted indices 
lied below the efficient frontier (Haugen & Baker, 1991; Hsu, 2006). For the Italian stock market, EW 
portfolio are more efficient than value-weighted indices (Ferretti & Murgia, 1991). Therefore, we 
prefer to focus on EW portfolios less biased than value-weighted ones to finding evidence of ARs.
The statistical significance of each single AR is assessed by the standardized return statistic:
 
In order to avoid possible contamination of anomalous price variations over the event window (see 
Kothari & Warner, 2007 on the issue), the standard deviation of the ARs has been estimated by its 
sample analogue computed over the 250 trading days before the beginning of the event period itself 
(the ‘estimation window’).
Estimates have been adjusted with a four-lag HCCME correction for serial dependence in the time 
series of returns. Assuming that the ARs are i.i.d. random variables, the SR statistic is distributed as 
a Student’s t with 249 degrees of freedom (Brown & Warner, 1985) for any t.
We have used (2) to test for anomalies on the day of the event and on each of the following four 
days. Furthermore, we have computed the cumulative abnormal return (CAR):
 
CARs have been examined over several periods in the event window: from t0 = −20 to t1 = −1 (the 
20 days prior to the event), from t0 = 0 to t1 = +4 (the day of the event and the 4 following days), from 
t0 = 0 to t1 = +9 (from the day of the event to the 9th following day), and from t0 = 0 to t1 = +19 (ap-
proximately four trading weeks from the event date onwards). The statistical significance of the CAR 
values is checked using the Portfolio Test Statistics (Aharony, Saunders, & Swary, 1988)9:
 
Under the previous assumptions on the ARs, the PTS distribution is approximately a standard 
normal.
The same methodology has been followed to uncover the potential presence of a widespread 
‘Small&Value’ effect in other four European countries: France, Germany, Spain and United Kingdom. 
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In this case, the event study is based on MSCI price indices, and the ARs are day-by-day differences 
between the Small&Value index’ return and the Small&Growth index’ return. If the Small&Value in-
dices showed a significant and positive extra-performance over the Small&Growth indices over the 
same days of our post-event period, we should conclude that the price reaction of our Bottom50 
portfolio could be spurious and not related to the publication of the PBV ratio, being the simple re-
flection of a general ‘Value effect’ among small stocks in the European markets.
Regression analyses have been performed by regressing daily returns of the Top50 and the 
Bottom50 portfolios on the following independent variables: (a) the daily returns of the EW stock 
market index; (b) a dummy for each day from 11 September 2001 to the end of the month in order 
to isolate the examination of the impact of PBV publication on prices from any possible contamina-
tion of that period of extreme market volatility on AR’s estimation and testing; (c) a dummy for each 
of the 40 days of the event window; (d) the daily returns of the ‘size’ portfolio (SMB); (e) the daily 
returns of the ‘value’ portfolio (LMH).10 CARs for each period of interest have been calculated by add-
ing together the coefficients on the dummies associated to the days they comprised. Inference on 
the regression (cumulated) ARs are based either on the Wald test statistic, referring to its asymptotic 
distribution or to its wild bootstrap empirical distribution for critical values (see Davidson & Flachaire, 
2008; and the 9.0 version of the software Eventus (2010)). In both cases, standard errors are esti-
mated by White’s robust HCCME.11 All econometric details are provided in the appendix.
4. Results
Table 2 shows ARs of the Top50 and Bottom50 portfolios against their control samples (Panel A) and 
the EW-index (Panel B) for the pre-event trading month, the event day and each of the following four 
days, and periods of five, ten and twenty trading days starting from the event date; p-values are also 
displayed.
For the Top50 portfolio there is not any evidence of anomalies both over the pre- and the post-
event month.12 Since most Top 50 stocks are large-cap firms, evidence of any reaction would be 
strongly at odds with market efficiency, as the pricing of these stocks is unlikely to be affected by 
retail traders in any relevant way. A very different evidence emerges for the Bottom50 portfolio, 
because from the day of PBVs publication large and positive abnormal performances are observed. 
The CARs are strongly significant for the two longer time intervals, adding up to about 6% over a 
month for those based on the control sample. The positive abnormal performance in day +1 and the 
negative abnormal performance over the previous month lay on the border of significance.
If the publication of the PBV is taken as informative by retail investors whose trading influences 
small-value stock prices, then this first evidence raises some questions. Why does the Bottom50 
portfolio react so slowly? The first highly statistically significant AR appears on day +5. Why does the 
reaction of the Bottom50 portfolio last such a long time, from the second to the fourth week after 
the event? Is there a market trend favourable to small-value stocks that has nothing to do with the 
event?
Actually, a market trend in favour of small value stocks shows up in the dynamics of the trading 
volume of our two portfolios. Figure 1 illustrates the market adjusted abnormal turnover of the 
Top50 and the Bottom50 portfolios over the event window.13 A relevant shift in the trading activity 
from growth stocks (Top50) to small value stocks (Bottom50) is observable in the post-event period: 
the magnitude of the abnormal turnover strongly increases in both portfolios but with a negative 
sign for the former and a positive sign for the latter.
For sure, this shift in the investment style preferences (from growth to value stocks) seems to be 
a peculiarity of Italy. The data of Table 3 reveal that, in the post-event period, the index of 
‘Small&Value’ shares does not statistically outperform the index of ‘Small&Growth’ shares in any of 
the four examined European countries. This evidence supports the hypothesis that the positive ab-
normal performance of the Bottom50 portfolio is rooted in the publication of the PBV ratio.
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Table 4 shows the CARs obtained controlling for the size and the value effect through Fama and 
French (1993) three-factor pricing model. The statistical significance of each CAR is assessed through 
the Wald test statistics which is compared to its asymptotical distribution, as well as to the more 
Table 2. Event study of Top50 and Bottom50 portfolios
Notes: The Top50 (Bottom50) portfolio includes the first (last) fifty stocks by PBV ranking, as of 2.28.2002. The control 
samples replicate the average market capitalization of the Top50 and the Bottom50 portfolios. The stocks of the control 
samples are selected from the stocks with mid-range PBV on a pair-wise basis. The equally weighted market index is 
the simple average of prices of all stocks traded on the Italian Stock Exchange. Abnormal returns (AR) are simple day-
by-day differences from the control sample (EW-Index). All abnormal returns are cumulated (CAR) for any period but for 
the event day and the following four days. p-Values from Student’s t for daily abnormal returns and from standardized 
normal (z) for CARs. The standard deviation of the abnormal returns’ time series is computed by using a Newey–West 
correction for serial dependence.
Top50 Bottom50
Value (%) p-Value Value (%) p-Value
Panel A: against control sample
CAR −20 to −1 0.48 0.818 −4.04 0.060
AR 0 (event day) 0.08 0.857 −0.03 0.960
AR +1 0.13 0.780 0.93 0.055
AR +2 0.07 0.873 −0.21 0.660
AR +3 0.20 0.660 0.61 0.205
AR +4 0.26 0.569 0.65 0.178
CAR 0 to +4 0.74 0.465 1.94 0.070
CAR 0 to +9 −0.59 0.682 4.42 0.004
CAR 0 to +19 −0.35 0.865 5.82 0.007
Panel B: against EW-market index
CAR −20 to −1 0.77 0.675 −2.66 0.049
AR 0 (event day) 0.22 0.583 0.00 0.992
AR +1 0.38 0.348 0.58 0.056
AR +2 −0.07 0.857 −0.04 0.889
AR +3 0.30 0.466 0.15 0.625
AR +4 0.13 0.742 0.53 0.081
CAR 0 to +4 0.96 0.289 1.21 0.072
CAR 0 to +9 −0.70 0.582 3.33 0.001
CAR 0 to +19 −0.94 0.603 3.74 0.005
Figure 1. Abnormal turnover. Abnormal turnover
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Table 3. Event study of Small&Value Index vs. Small&Growth Index
Notes: Abnormal returns (AR) are simple day-by-day differences between the Small&Value shares’ return and the 
Small&Growth shares’ return (MSCI price indexes). All abnormal returns are cumulated (CAR) for any period but for the 
event day and the following four days. p-Values from Student’s t for daily abnormal returns and from standardized 
normal (z) for CARs. The standard deviation of the abnormal returns’ time series is computed by using a Newey–West 
correction for serial dependence.
Value (%) p-Value Value (%) p-Value
France Germany
CAR −20 to −1 3.33 0.358 1.82 0.736
AR 0 (event day) 0.02 0.977 0.00 1.000
AR +1 −0.34 0.676 −0.38 0.756
AR +2 0.31 0.703 0.43 0.721
AR +3 −0.22 0.790 −0.28 0.816
AR +4 0.32 0.695 −0.45 0.712
CAR 0 to +4 0.10 0.958 −0.67 0.804
CAR 0 to +9 1.06 0.679 0.07 0.985
CAR 0 to +19 −0.40 0.912 0.40 0.942
Spain United Kingdom
CAR −20 to −1 5.22 0.029 5.17 0.052
AR 0 (event day) −0.72 0.176 0.01 0.983
AR +1 −1.05 0.049 0.02 0.969
AR +2 −0.17 0.751 0.15 0.803
AR +3 −0.73 0.174 −0.13 0.826
AR +4 0.43 0.419 −0.19 0.753
CAR 0 to +4 −2.24 0.061 −0.13 0.920
CAR 0 to +9 −2.58 0.126 0.88 0.638
CAR 0 to +19 −3.19 0.181 1.06 0.689
Table 4. Three-factor model’s abnormal returns
Notes: The Top50 (Bottom50) portfolio includes the first (last) fifty stocks by PBV ranking, as of 2.28.2002. The three 
factors are: the Equally Weighted Market Index of the Italian Stock Exchange, the SMB portfolio, and the LMH portfolio. 
SMB and LMH portfolios are formed following Fama and French (1993); since we base the analysis on the price-to-
book ratio the Low Minus High (LMH) portfolio replaces the High Minus Low (HML) portfolio. All abnormal returns are 
cumulated for any period but for the event day and the following four days. The values reported in the columns with 
label Test are the Wald test p-values based on the White robust HCCME (described in equation A.3), and using either the 
asymptotic F distribution (W), or the wild boostrapped distribution driven by a two-point distribution for the 휀∗
t
 (W1), or 
the wild bootstrapped distribution driven by a Rademacher distribution for the 휀∗
t
 (W2).
Top50 Bottom50
CAR (%) Test CAR (%) Test
W W1 W2 W W1 W2
−20 to −1 0.23 0.5198 0.7836 0.7722 −1.39 0.0340 0.3722 0.3644
0 (event day) −0.07 0.0151 0.3370 0.5138 0.10 0.0009 0.3398 0.4894
+1 −0.14 0.0159 0.3120 0.5058 0.62 0.0000 0.2736 0.4758
+2 0.00 0.6131 0.6484 0.6602 −0.05 0.0274 0.4116 0.4906
+3 −0.09 0.0424 0.3460 0.5042 0.21 0.0000 0.3030 0.4764
+4 0.03 0.5369 0.5966 0.6108 0.54 0.0417 0.2886 0.3886
0 to +4 −0.26 0.1033 0.3106 0.3052 1.42 0.0000 0.0758 0.0748
0 to +9 −1.24 0.0000 0.1214 0.1296 3.01 0.0000 0.0116 0.0104
0 to +19 −0.88 0.1592 0.4080 0.4138 2.69 0.0000 0.1816 0.1988
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robust wild bootstrap distributions. The new evidence confirms the lack of significant ARs pre- and 
post-event for the Top50 portfolio, while revealing some differences for the Bottom50 portfolio. The 
CAR for the Bottom50 portfolio is statistically insignificant over the pre-event window. A statistically 
significant reaction of the low-PBV portfolio CAR occurs during the event day and it ends at t = +9, 
after 10 days from the event. Moreover, a modest contribution to the assessed extra-performance 
comes from the CAR of the first five days, which is only weakly significant.
The regression-based ARs in Table 4 provide strong evidence that the Bottom50 portfolio reaction 
went beyond any underlying value trend, and that it had a temporary nature. These elements sup-
port some preliminary conclusions: (a) something happened that affected the pricing of small-value 
stocks, but not the pricing of growth stocks, though (b) it had not any real informative content since 
the effects of the initial market reaction were eliminated in just a couple of weeks: the 0 to +19 CAR 
is 32 bp less than the 0 to +9 CAR and non-statistically significant. This evidence is what we should 
expect when uninformative news influences the buying decisions of naïve investors, whose trades 
make small stocks overvalued and trigger sales by professional traders. The Bottom50 abnormal 
turnover behaviour (Figure 1) supports this explanation: a first wave of heavy trading occurred from 
day +4 to day +10, with a simultaneous positive surge in prices, and a second wave of heavy trading, 
from day +12 to day +17, was associated with ARs disappearing.
What was the event that temporarily influenced the Bottom50 portfolio? Could it be the PBV pub-
lication, despite a delayed reaction of four trading days? There are some arguments that make it 
more than plausible the hypothesis that the information about the PBV multiple was wrongly re-
garded as real news by small traders.
Reactions to news by small traders are documented in the literature to be more sluggish than re-
actions by institutional investors.14 In contrast with the Top50 portfolio, micro- and small-cap stocks, 
for which the average size of market orders is very low, mainly compose the Bottom50 portfolio; 
large professional investors often neglect these stocks and, consequently, their pricing is more af-
fected by the decisions of small traders.15
Individual investors suffer from cognitive biases in the information acquisition process that may 
reduce the speed of reaction to news; one of these distortions is inattention. DellaVigna and Pollet 
(2005) find that price and trading reactions to earnings announcements at odds with expectations 
occur later when the news appears on Fridays than on any other day of the week. The study provides 
evidence that data published on Fridays refer to companies with average size smaller than that of 
companies which issue earnings statements on other days of the week; also, delayed reactions to 
Friday news become insignificant when the size of companies is closer to average. These findings 
may indicate that the attention gap mainly affects small investors, as long as the incidence of trad-
ing by professional investors tends to decrease with the issuer’s size.16 This evidence is particularly 
important in our context, since the day in which the publication of the PBV started was a Friday.
It is worthwhile remarking that while attention can be obtained through emphasis from profes-
sional as well as retail investors, in our case the publication of PBVs was not a glamorous event; it 
was just the addition of two more columns in a table with 197 rows and 46 columns published on the 
last page of the newspaper. Also, according to some research, inattention for a quite long time can 
even be a rational behaviour when investors face information and transactions costs (Abel, Eberly, & 
Panageas, 2013); these costs are undoubtedly higher for small than for large investors. Experimental 
findings suggest that individual investors, on average, check their portfolios once a year (Benartzi & 
Thaler, 1995). Inattention is also greater during periods when markets are falling (Hou et al., 2006).17 
The publication of PBVs on Il Sole 24 Ore occurred when the Italian stock market index had declined 
by 20% in the previous 12 months. However, our data show that in the post-event trading month the 
market experienced a price increase of 9.2%, as measured by the EW index, and of 6.3% according 
to the value-weighted Comit Global Price Index; also, its trend was flat during the pre-event trading 
month. Argentesi et al. (2010) find that, over the 1978–2003 period, the Italian stock market index 
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and the number of Il Sole 24 Ore sold copies, excluding subscriptions, followed the same trend, and 
that the former predicts the latter. According to the authors, non-professional investors tend to buy 
newspapers when stock prices are high and do not buy them when prices are low. On the other hand, 
more newspaper sales are not found to be systematically correlated with an increase in trading 
activity.
Concerning the interpretation of our results, these finding are coherent with more small investors 
buying Il Sole 24 Ore in the post event month, thus increasing the potential diffusion of the informa-
tion on PBVs among them.18 However, the attitude to inattention of small investors and their slug-
gishness in trading on news could explain the observed delay in price reaction (Peng, 2005).19
5. Conclusions
With effect from 1 March 2002, Il Sole 24 Ore, Italy’s leading economic and financial newspaper, 
started to publish the PBV ratio of the stocks listed on the Italian Stock Exchange on a daily basis. In 
principle, the publication of these data in the paper media should not have had any significant effect 
on stocks’ performance. The multiple is based on public information (the net book value and market 
price) easily accessible to professional investors, and is also normally distributed to them by special-
ist data providers, or contained in the reports they receive from financial analysts. Therefore, the 
stock prices of an information-efficient market should have already reflected any significant infor-
mation contained in the PBV figures and stock prices should not have reacted to the publication of 
the multiple in the newspaper in any way.
However, our research reveals an average increase in the price of the 50 stocks with the lowest 
PBV values, mainly small- and micro-caps, that cannot be attributed to market dynamics only. 
Indeed, this phenomenon is not observed in other European stock markets over the same period. 
The extra-performance disappears two weeks after the event. This variation is consistent with the 
hypothesis that some investors considered the published PBVs as providing valuable information 
and consequently increased their demand for low-PBV stocks believing that they were, on average, 
undervalued, though that information was actually already embedded in the stock prices. Conversely, 
the portfolio of the 50 stocks with the highest PBV, mainly large and medium caps, did not show any 
reaction.
Therefore, size appears to be a factor that can account for the observed extra-performance after 
the publication of the multiple in the newspaper. We believe that this is because of the (relatively) 
important role of small traders on the market for small-cap stocks. These stocks normally receive 
only limited attention from institutional investors; they often feature low liquidity and a low fre-
quency and size of trades, so that the activity of small, non-professional investors can play an impor-
tant role in setting market prices.
This explanation can be supported by two arguments. First, it is likely that most small traders did 
not know the PBV figures before their publication in the newspaper, because they have no access to 
the expensive channels through which these data are normally available to professional investors; 
for small investors those figures were probably genuine news. The second factor is that the price 
reaction observed after the first publication date occurred only few days later and continued over a 
week. On the basis of previous research, this kind of price dynamics strongly points to the impor-
tance of small traders on the market since, unlike professional investors, they normally show some 
inertia in reacting to news, often causing momentum effects in price variations.
The results of our research provide empirical evidence supporting the hypothesis that newspapers 
can influence prices by publishing information which is not new, but is effectively distributed only 
among some market participants. Furthermore, our study differs from previous work on the subject 
in showing that the influence of newspapers on stock prices does not necessarily depend on the re-
working of information, the emphasis or the spin with which it is presented to readers. Even the 
simple publication of a raw figure like the PBV ratio can have significant, though transitory, effects 
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on prices. These conclusions reinforce the claim that, as already put forward by other authors, news-
papers are still a significant information channel for small investors, due to their low costs and wide 
distribution, in spite of the competition of radio, television, the electronic media and the Internet.
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Notes
1. Dyck and Zingales (2003) call this explanation for a 
positive spin ‘quid-pro-quo’ theory. For other theories 
of media bias see Baron (2006), Besley and Prat (2006), 
Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005), Gentzkow and 
Shapiro (2006).
2. See also the recent study of reaction of Italian stocks 
to attention grabbling stale information by Cervellati, 
Ferretti, and Pattitoni (2014)
3. On Il Sole 24 Ore absolute leadership in the Italian finan-
cial daily press sector, see data provided in Argentesi, 
Lütkepohl, and Motta (2010). The multiples published 
by Il Sole 24 Ore are historic figures since they are based 
on the data reported in the last financial statement ap-
proved by the General Shareholders Meeting.
4. For empirical evidence on the ‘value premium’ see, 
among others: Basu (1977), Fama and French (1993), 
Davis (1994), Davis, Fama, and French (2000), Adrian 
and Franzoni (2004), Ang and Chen (2007).
5. On the profitability of investing in stocks with low PBV 
and on the precautions to be taken when using this 
multiple as a stock picking tool, see above all Damoda-
ran (2004, Chapter 4).
6. The use of portfolios with 50 stock is in line with exist-
ing studies, see for instance Kolari and Pynnnen (2011), 
following the design set-up by Brown and Warner 
(1985), drawing, in their simulation study, portfolios 
with a maximum size set equal to 50 stocks.
7. The Top50 portfolio includes four shares with less than 
270 pre-event observations: Juventus (46 observa-
tions), Amplifon (170), Air Dolomiti (181), Lottomatica 
(200).
8. Since the percentage of negative returns for the TOP50 
portfolio is 47%, while the one associated with the 
BOTTOM50 portfolio is 51%, we exclude that portfolio 
stock returns for BOTTOM50 arrive from very few stock 
returns.
9. On significance tests for ARs, see also Brown and 
Warner (1985), Mikkelson and Partch (1986), Hannan 
and Wolken (1989), DeLong (2001). For a survey of the 
event studies methodology, see MacKinley (1997).
10. The ‘size’ and the ‘value’ portfolios for the Italian mar-
ket are formed following the Fama and French (1993) 
procedure. Both factors are statistically significant in our 
regression. Since we base the analysis on the price-to-
book ratio the Low Minus High (LMH) portfolio replaces 
the High Minus Low (HML) portfolio.
11. See Arghyrou and Gregoriou (2007) and also Sajjad, Coakley, 
and Nankervis (2008) for financial econometrics applications 
of the wild bootstrap beyond event study analysis.
12. Similar tests were run on sub-intervals of the pre-event 
period that also confirmed the absence of any anoma-
lies in excess returns.
13. The abnormal volumes are derived from the estimation 
of the regression equation:
where Tp is the daily turnover of either the Top50 or 
the Bottom50 portfolios, Tm is the stock market’s daily 
turnover (defined as the EW average of individual 
stocks’ turnover) and Di are the event-window dummy 
variables, so that estimated gamma’s measure abnor-
mal volumes. Turnover is defined as the ratio of the 
number of shares traded in a given day to the number 
of outstanding shares.
14. See: Cready (1988), Lee (1992), Battalio and Mendenhall 
(2005), Shanthikumar (2012), Lamont and Frazzini (2007).
15. On this point see Bhattacharya (2001). To sum up the 
concept, Bhattacharya (2001, p. 222) states: ‘On aver-
age, wealthier and more informed investors are likely to 
make larger trades, whereas less wealthy and less in-
formed investors are likely to make smaller trades’. The 
author also notes that small trades refer above all to 
the stocks of firms with only a limited amount of public 
information, such as small firms. Moreover, according to 
Baker and Wurgler (2007), small company size is one of 
the typical features of stocks most affected by investor 
sentiment and thus by behavioural biases. Sarin, Shastri, 
and Shastri (2000) find that average transaction size is 
larger in firms with higher institutional ownership.
16. Other examples of inattention are documented in Fran-
cis, Pagach, and Stephan (1992), Bagnoli, Clement, and 
Watts (2005), DellaVigna and Pollet (2009), Hirshleifer, 
Lim, and Teoh (2009), Hou, Xiong, and Peng (2006). Ac-
cording to Barber and Odean (2008), individual investors 
face serious search problems in buying decisions, while 
selling decisions are much easier; a way to simplify 
the buying decision is to focus on attention-grabbing 
securities. As a consequence, events capturing the 
investors’ attention tend to induce more buying than 
selling. The asymmetric performance of the Top50 and 
the Bottom50 portfolios may also reflect this kind of 
investors’ bias.
17. Inaction when stock prices are low is also put forward 
by Karlsson, Loewenstein, and Seppi (2009), who note 
that investors tend to check their portfolios more often 
when stock prices are rising than when they are falling.
18. One referee suggested that we should control for the 
role played by competing news. We argue that this type 
of robustness check would affect our empirical findings 
only in the unlikely case of competing news prevailing in 
one of the two portfolios.
19. Sluggish price variations can also be explained by the 
distracting effect of a large number of announcements 
mainly affecting small stocks (Hirshleifer et al., 2009).
Tpt = 훼 + 훽Tmt +
19∑
i=−20
훾iDi + ut
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Appendix
Estimation and inference on CARs
With the regression method, abnormal returns are computed from the linear regression equation:
 
where the coefficients are estimated by ordinary least squares. Beta’s are the coefficients associ-
ated with the Fama and French (1993) three factors, while gamma’s on the D dummy variables, one 
for each day of the event window, have been inserted to account for event-related anomalies in 
portfolio returns. This regression was estimated on the whole data-set (i.e. estimation window and 
event window), since the dummies warrant that estimates of alpha and beta’s are not affected by 
the values of any event-period return. In order to control for the influence of extreme September 
2001 volatility, we augmented our basic regression equation by dummying out all September days 
from Tuesday 11th onwards. Then, CARs can easily be computed as sums of the appropriate gamma 
estimates, and hypothesis testing on the event effects conducted with the Wald test (Greene, 2003, 
Chapter 5).
For inference purpose, we use the following Wald test statistics, which follows a chi-squared dis-
tribution with degrees-of-freedom equal to the number of zero restrictions on the gammas:
 
(A.1)Rt = 훼 + 훽1Rmt + 훽2SMBt + 훽3LMHt +
N∑
i=1
훾
i
D
i
+ u
t
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where theta is the k-dimensional vector of all parameters entering the unrestricted regression (A.1) 
and C is the 1 × k matrix designing the restrictions. To avoid making inference based on a biased 
estimate of the parameters’ covariance matrix due to heteroscedasticity in the time series of re-
turns, the Wald test statistics is constructed using the Heteroscedastic Consistent Covariance Matrix 
Estimator (HCCME) given by:
 
where the estimated T × T diagonal matrix Ω has as a constant element a2
t
û2
t
 with û
t
 being the OLS 
residual from the unrestricted regression (A.1). If the scalars at are set to unity the HC0 version of the 
White robust covariance matrix estimator obtains, while setting at to 
√
n (n − k)−1 gives the HC1 ver-
sion, which is adjusted for finite samples. However, as shown by Flachaire (2005) and by Davidson 
and Flachaire (2008), hypothesis testing could still be affected by size distortions when using the 
HCCME on small samples even in the HC1 version. Therefore, we follow the suggestions of Flachaire 
(2005) and by Davidson and Flachaire (2008) and use wild bootstrapping to compute the finite-
sample distribution of the Wald test statistics. The bootstrap series of artificial returns are generated 
through the equation:
 
where 𝛽  and ũ
t
 are the OLS estimated coefficients and residuals from the restricted linear regression 
model (i.e. the model with all gamma’s set to zero). Following Davidson and Flachaire (2008), the 휀∗
t
 
are white noise innovations artificially generated from either the two-point distribution:
or from the Rademacher distribution:
The bootstrap resampling is carried out on ũ
t
𝜀
∗
t
 over 5,000 replications. The Wald test statistics cor-
responding to the mth replication is:
 
where the θ and Ω estimates are from the unrestricted OLS regression associated with the mth boot-
strap replication generated by equation (A.4). This procedure provides the empirical distribution for 
the Wald test based upon the HCCME estimator. Therefore, the bootstrap p-value of W is computed 
as:
where B = 5,000 and I(·) is the indicator function, that takes value one when the Wald statistics cor-
responding to the mth replication (Wm) is greater than the Wald test statistics (A.3) from the unre-
stricted OLS regression, and value zero otherwise.
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